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SUNBEAM OFFERS A RAY OF SUNSHINE
FOR THE LICENSEE WHEN A LICENSOR




In 1985, industries that relied heavily on intellectual property licenses
were dealt a severe blow when the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a licensee of patent rights could be deprived of the continued use
of patent technology by reason of the licensor rejecting the license in bank-
ruptcy. In Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,'
the appellate court characterized a nonexclusive patent license as an execu-
tory contract within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and approved
rejection of the license by the licensor because it was advantageous to the
licensor's Chapter 11 reorganization effort. The result, according to the
Fourth Circuit, was that the licensee lost its right to use the intellectual
property for which it had bargained, had no right to specific performance
of the licensing agreement, and was left with nothing but a money-damages
claim against the bankruptcy estate.2
It did not take long for Congress to respond to Lubrizol by enacting the
Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, which added
§ 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code. This section grants the licensee of intel-
lectual property the option to treat a licensor's rejection as a termination of
the license or, alternatively, to continue to use the intellectual property for
the remaining term of the rejected license, including any term extension to
which the licensee is otherwise entitled, in exchange for continued pay-
ments of royalties in accordance with the license agreement. Congress,
however, defined "intellectual property" in the Bankruptcy Code so as to
exclude trademarks, deliberately depriving trademark licensees of the pro-
tections afforded by § 365(n). Though Congress intended to return to the
subject of trademark licensees in bankruptcy at a later time, Congress took
* Alan N. Resnick is the Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Professor of Bank-
ruptcy Law at Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University, and of counsel to
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP in New York. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the valuable assistance of Garrett Ledgerwood, and Keely Hamlin, associates at
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, in the research and writing of this article.
1. 756 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
2. Id. at 1048.
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no further legislative action to protect such licensees. Therefore, trademark
licensees remained vulnerable.
As shocking as Lubrizol was to all licensees of intellectual property, and
as disappointing as the exclusion of trademarks from the protections of
§ 365(n) was to trademark licensees, a recent decision by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in the Sunbeam case3 is an unexpected cause
for celebration by trademark licensees. The Seventh Circuit, twenty-
seven years after the decision in Lubrizol, directly rejected the holding and
reasoning of the Fourth Circuit and held, based on its analysis of bank-
ruptcy law, that a trademark licensee cannot be deprived of the right to use
a trademark under a license agreement despite rejection of the agreement in
the bankruptcy case of the licensor. The United States Supreme Court de-
clined to review the Sunbeam decision, thereby leaving a circuit split and
many unanswered questions regarding the effect of a licensor's rejection of
a trademark license agreement in bankruptcy.
I. INTRODUCTIONIT is common for a purchaser of a business to want to use the trade
name and trademark long associated with the business so as to cap-
ture its goodwill and reputation. A seller that does not want to part
with the trademark often grants the buyer a long-term license to use the
seller's trademark. From the licensee's standpoint, the right to use the
trademark under a licensing agreement can be among the most valuable
assets purchased in the transaction. It is also common for the owner of a
trademark to grant several entities exclusive or nonexclusive licenses to
use the trademark in certain geographic areas or on certain products, un-
related to any sale of other assets, while retaining ownership of the trade-
mark. In all of these scenarios, licensees often invest capital and build
their businesses based on an expectation of uninterrupted use of the
trademark.
When a company seeks protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, the debtor in possession or trustee is granted extraordinary powers
not available to companies outside of bankruptcy. One of those powers is
the right to assume or reject executory contracts under § 365(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 4 Historically, at least since 1985 when the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., the power to reject executory contracts
enabled trademark licensors in bankruptcy to effectively terminate the
right of trademark licensees to use trademarks despite the contractual
arrangements of the parties and the continuation of the licensees' willing-
ness to pay royalties.5 Congress responded to Lubrizol by enacting legis-
lation to protect licensees of intellectual property from the deprivation of
3. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2012).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012).
5. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
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their rights to continued use of licensed intellectual property when a li-
censor rejects the license in bankruptcy, but such protection was not af-
forded to trademark licensees. 6 Most recently, however, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the holding and analysis of
Lubrizol and held that rejection of a trademark license by a licensor in
bankruptcy does not deprive the licensee of its right to continued use of
the trademark for the duration of the license period, resulting in a circuit
split over the consequences flowing from rejection of a trademark license
agreement.7
This Article will discuss the issue of whether a trademark licensor may
deprive a licensee of the use of the trademark by becoming a debtor in a
bankruptcy case and rejecting the license as an executory contract. It be-
gins in Part I with a general discussion of the powers of a trustee or
debtor in possession to reject executory contracts under the Bankruptcy
Code, the meaning of "executory contract," and the consequences of a
rejection. Part II of this Article focuses on the landmark decision in
Lubrizol,8 in which the rejection of intellectual property licensing agree-
ments resulted in the termination of the licensee's right to use the intel-
lectual property. Part III discusses Congress's response to Lubrizol, the
enactment of the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of
1988,9 which added § 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code but did not include
trademarks within the protection afforded to licensees. Part IV discusses
transaction structures designed in the wake of Lubrizol and the 1988 Act
in an attempt to reduce risk and potential harm to a trademark licensee in
the event that the licensor rejects the trademark licensing agreement in
bankruptcy. Part V discusses the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sunbeam
Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC,10 which re-
jected the holding of Lubrizol and protects the right of licensees to con-
tinue to use trademarks despite rejection by the licensor in bankruptcy.
But the decision leaves several questions unanswered regarding its impact
on the survival of the obligations of the parties after a rejection.
II. THE POWERS OF A TRUSTEE OR DEBTOR IN
POSSESSION TO ASSUME OR REJECT EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
To help maximize the value of a bankruptcy estate for the benefit of
creditors or to assist a company reorganizing under Chapter 11, a trustee
in bankruptcy is granted extraordinary powers that are unavailable to the
debtor outside of the bankruptcy system, including, among others, the
6. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-56, 102
Stat. 2538, 2539 (codified in Title 11 of the United States Code).
7. Sunbeam Prods., 686 F.3d at 376.
8. 756 F.2d. at 1046-47.
9. 102 Stat. at 2538-39.
10. 686 F.3d at 376.
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power to avoid unperfected security interests," to recover preferential
payments to creditors made shortly before bankruptcy,12 and to avoid
pre-bankruptcy fraudulent transfers of the debtor's assets.' 3 Also in-
cluded among these powers is the ability to assume or reject executory
contracts and unexpired leases. 14 The rationale for granting this power is
that the trustee or debtor in possession should be able to take advantage
of favorable, yet-to-be-performed contracts that benefit the bankruptcy
estate while abandoning those unfavorable contracts that otherwise
would burden the estate.15 Subject to certain exceptions,16 § 365(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee may assume or reject execu-
tory contracts and unexpired leases of the debtor.17 These extraordinary
powers may also be exercised by a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11
case." Notwithstanding this broad power, a decision by the trustee or
debtor in possession to assume or reject an executory contract is subject
to bankruptcy court approval. 19 The bankruptcy court's oversight, how-
ever, is highly deferential, generally applying the "business judgment"
standard when determining the propriety of the assumption or rejection
decision by the trustee or debtor in possession.20
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2012).
12. Id. § 547.
13. Id. § 548.
14. Id. § 365(a).
15. See, e.g., In re Compass Van & Storage Corp., 65 B.R. 1007, 1010 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). The exceptions relate to the trustee's right to assume, rather
than reject, executory contracts. In certain situations an executory contract may not be
assumed, including, among others, (i) where the debtor has defaulted in the performance
of the contract and the debtor has neither cured the default nor provide adequate assur-
ance that it will promptly cure the default, or has failed to provide compensation for any
losses as a result of such default, or has failed to provide adequate assurance of future
performance, id. § 365(b); (ii) where the contract is a pre-bankruptcy agreement to provide
a loan or other financing to the debtor, id. § 365(c)(2); (iii) where applicable law excuses a
party other than the debtor from accepting performance from or rendering performance to
another entity without its consent, such as personal services contracts that are nonassigna-
ble as a matter of law, id. § 365(c)(1); or (iv) where the contract is not timely assumed, id.
§ 365(d).
17. Id. § 365(a); see generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 365.01-.03 (Alan N. Res-
nick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012).
18. In a case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a "debtor in possession" is the
debtor, which is operated by its managers, if a trustee is not serving in the case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1101(1). A trustee is not appointed in Chapter 11 cases unless there is cause to appoint
one, such as if the debtor's managers are grossly incompetent or dishonest. See id.
§ 1104(a). In the vast majority of Chapter 11 cases, a trustee is not appointed and the
debtor remains the debtor in possession. In general, a debtor in possession has all the
rights and powers of a trustee. See id. § 1107(a). Accordingly, subject to limited exceptions,
references in the Bankruptcy Code to the "trustee" include the debtor in possession when
the bankruptcy case is a case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. For ease of refer-
ence, this Article uses the term "debtor" when referring to a debtor in possession or the
trustee with respect to the power to assume or reject executory contracts.
19. Id. § 365(a).
20. See, e.g., In re Pomona Valley Med. Grp., 476 F.3d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 2007); Orion
Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993).
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A. THE EFFECTS OF ASSUMPTION AND REJECTION
To fully appreciate the power of assumption or rejection, it is necessary
to understand the consequences of rejecting or assuming an executory
contract. If a debtor assumes an executory contract in bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy estate adopts it as its own, which means it accepts responsibil-
ity to fully perform its obligations under the contract. 21 If the debtor
breaches following assumption or formally rejects the contract after as-
suming it, any resulting claims (including any right to monetary damages
resulting from a post-assumption breach) are entitled to payment as an
administrative expense in the bankruptcy case. 22 Under § 507(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code, administrative expense claims are entitled to priority
in payment over other unsecured creditors, 23 including priority over most
other unsecured claims that are also entitled to some degree of priority,
such as employee wage claimS2 4 and priority tax claims.25 Moreover, in a
Chapter 11 case, except to the extent that an administrative expense
claimant agrees otherwise, a plan cannot be confirmed unless it proposes
to pay administrative claims in full on the effective date of the plan.2 6
Conversely, where the debtor rejects an executory contract, such rejec-
tion constitutes a breach of the contract by the debtor.27 The breach is
treated under the Bankruptcy Code as though it occurred immediately
before the date of the commencement of the bankruptcy case.28 Under
§ 502(g)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the nondebtor party to the rejected
contract is entitled to a prepetition claim against the estate for damages
incurred as a result of the breach.29 Courts have held that rejection termi-
nates any right that the nondebtor party would have had under applicable
nonbankruptcy law to obtain specific performance, thereby limiting the
nondebtor party to the assertion of a money-damages claim against the
bankruptcy estate.30 Unlike a claim for breach of a contract previously
assumed by a debtor, however, a claim flowing from a debtor's rejection
of an executory contract not previously assumed is not entitled to admin-
istrative priority.31 As a result, unless the claim is otherwise secured by
collateral or independently entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy
Code, the nondebtor party to the rejected contract will share pro rata
with the debtor's other general unsecured creditors. 32 To the extent that
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(c).
22. See id. §§ 503(b), 365(g)(2); see also, e.g., Adventure Res. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786,
793 (4th Cir. 1998).
23. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2), 726(a), 1129(a)(9)(A).
24. Id. § 507(a)(4).
25. Id. § 507(a)(8).
26. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A).
27. Id. § 365(g).
28. Id. § 365(g)(1).
29. Id. § 502(g)(1).
30. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984); Midway Motor
Lodge v. Innkeepers' Telemanagement & Equip. Corp., 54 F.3d 406, 407 (7th Cir. 1995).
31. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, 365.10[1].
32. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b).
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the claim remains unpaid after all distributions are made in the bank-
ruptcy case or under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, such claim is
discharged. 33
To illustrate the consequences of rejection, suppose that a debtor is a
party to a pre-bankruptcy contract for the purchase of certain goods for a
total price of $100,000. The goods are to be delivered approximately
ninety days after the contract was formed and payment of the purchase
price is due thirty days after the delivery date. Before the delivery date,
the debtor files a Chapter 11 petition and discovers that the market price
for such goods fell sharply. In fact, the debtor could buy the same type of
goods of the same quality on the market from one of the seller's competi-
tors for only $60,000. If the debtor rejects this contract and buys the
goods from the seller's competitor, the rejection would be treated as a
breach of the agreement immediately before the filing of the petition.34
This breach would give the seller under the contract an unsecured, non-
priority prepetition claim against the bankruptcy estate for whatever
damages it suffers.35 Because the first seller would presumably be able to
mitigate damage by reselling its goods on the market for $60,000, the
seller would be left with a $40,000 damage claim against the bankruptcy
estate. If, based on the value of the property of the estate, unsecured
creditors are entitled to receive payment equal to only ten percent of
their unsecured claims in the bankruptcy case, the seller would receive
only $4,000 and the balance of the debt would be discharged. Thus, by
rejecting the contract, the debtor in possession would pay only $4,000 for
the opportunity to be relieved from its obligation to purchase the goods
from the original seller, despite the fact that under non-bankruptcy law
the original seller would be entitled to a $40,000 money judgment against
the debtor.
B. WHAT IS AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT?
The right to assume or reject under § 365(a) applies only to those con-
tracts that are executory on the date when the bankruptcy case is com-
menced.36 The term "executory contract" is not defined in the
Bankruptcy Code.37 However, the prevailing definition used by most
courts is one commonly known as the "Countryman definition," named
after the late Professor Vern Countryman of Harvard Law School. As
discussed below, Professor Countryman developed his definition of exec-
utory contracts taking into consideration the consequences of assumption
and rejection.
In a 1973 article, Professor Countryman analyzed in great depth the
33. Id. §H 727(b), 1141(d).
34. See id. § 365(g).
35. See id. § 502(g).
36. Id. § 365(a); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, 365.02[2][e].
37. See generally COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, 1 365.02[2][e].
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subject of executory contracts in bankruptcy.38 He began his analysis by
looking at the three types of unperformed contracts that exist outside of
bankruptcy: (i) contracts under which the nondebtor party has performed
all of its material obligations, but the debtor has not; (ii) contracts under
which the debtor has fully performed, but the nondebtor party has not;
and (iii) contracts under which both the debtor and the nondebtor party
have material obligations not yet performed at the time of bankruptcy. 39
Beginning with the premise that in bankruptcy the term "executory con-
tract" should be defined "in the light of the purpose for which the trustee
is given the option to assume or reject" 40 that the definition "should not
extend to situations where the only effect of its exercise would be to
prejudice other creditors of the estate." 41 Professor Countryman rea-
soned that the only contracts that should be treated as executory con-
tracts for bankruptcy purposes are the third type: contracts in which, at
the time the bankruptcy case was commenced, both the debtor and the
nondebtor party have material unperformed obligations remaining so
that a breach by either party would relieve the other of the obligation to
perform. 42
With respect to the first type of contract-where the nondebtor party
has completed performance but the debtor has not-Professor Country-
man reasoned that the trustee or debtor in possession should not be able
to assume the contract because to do so would provide no benefit to the
estate and would only serve to give preference to the claims of the
nondebtor party to the contract over other creditors of the estate.43 As a
practical matter, these contracts are in the nature of accounts payable
because there is nothing left but the debtor's duty to render its perform-
ance. There is no logical reason for a trustee or debtor to assume an ac-
count payable because "[t]he estate has whatever benefit it can obtain
from the other party's performance" without the need to assume it.44 The
only consequence of assumption in that circumstance would be to give
the nondebtor party an administrative expense claim for the full amount
of its damages at the expense of other creditors if the debtor fails to per-
form, and no reasonable trustee or debtor would opt to do that. And
rejecting an account payable would have no legal effect because, with or
without rejection, the nondebtor party has fully performed its obligations
under the contract and would be entitled to a prepetition unsecured claim
for the full amount of its damages. Thus, Professor Countryman con-
cluded that "[t]he trustee's option to assume or reject should not extend
to such contracts." 45 Consistent with this analysis, promissory notes and
38. See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MJNN. L. REV. 439
(1973).
39. Id. at 451-65.
40. Id. at 450.
41. Id. at 451.
42. Id. 457-60.
43. Id. at 451-52.




loan agreements under which there is no outstanding obligation other
than the debtor's obligation to pay money are not executory contracts
and may not be assumed or rejected.
With respect to the second type of contract-where the debtor has
completed performance but the nondebtor party to the contract has
not-Professor Countryman likewise concluded that the trustee should
not be able to reject such contracts because doing so would provide no
benefit to the estate.46 These contracts are in the nature of fully-earned
accounts receivable owned by the debtor. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition, a bankruptcy estate is created,47 which consists of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case."4 8 Property of the estate includes the debtor's contractual rights
to further performance due from a nondebtor party under a contract.49
Thus, assumption of an executory contract where the debtor has fully per-
formed adds nothing to the estate because the further performance by the
nondebtor party to which the debtor is entitled under the contract is al-
ready property of the estate.50 The trustee may simply enforce the
debtor's right to payment on its accounts receivable without the need to
assume the contract. Professor Countryman also wrote that the trustee
should not be permitted to reject the contract because, as discussed
above, rejection constitutes a breach of the contract by the debtor, which,
in light of the debtor's full performance, would make no sense.5'
For these reasons, Professor Countryman concluded that the only con-
tracts that should be subject to assumption or rejection by the trustee or
debtor in possession are those in which material performance remained
outstanding on both sides such that a breach by one party would excuse
the other party's performance under applicable nonbankruptcy law.5 2 In
that situation, the trustee or debtor would determine whether the con-
tract is a beneficial one that should be performed by the debtor and en-
forced against the nondebtor party, in which case it should be assumed.53
To illustrate, if the contract price for goods in the above hypothetical was
$100,000, the market price of such goods has risen to $140,000, and the
delivery date and payment date have not yet occurred, the trustee or
debtor would assume the contract so that the bankruptcy estate would
realize the benefit of this good bargain by paying $100,000 in exchange
46. Id. at 458.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
48. Id. § 541(a)(1).
49. See generally 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, 541.07[3].
50. See id.
51. Countryman, supra note 38, at 459 n.81.
52. Id. at 460-62. Professor Countryman defined material performance consistent with
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "[A] contract under which the obligation of both
the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far underperformed that the failure
of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the per-
formance of the other." Id. at 460; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241
(1981).
53. See Countryman, supra note 38, at 461.
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for goods now worth $140,000.54 But if the market price of the goods has
fallen to $60,000, the trustee or debtor should reject the contract, giving
the seller nothing but a $40,000 prebankruptcy unsecured claim against
the bankruptcy estate while relieving the trustee or debtor of the obliga-
tion to purchase the goods under that contract. As Professor Countryman
has noted, "Whether in a given case the trustee will assume or reject de-
pends, presumably, on his comparative appraisal of the value of the re-
maining performance by the other party and the cost to the estate of the
unperformed obligation of the bankrupt."55
Though the Countryman definition has been adopted by the vast ma-
jority of courts that have addressed the issue, and no circuit has rejected
it outright, 56 a few courts have used a different test that has been charac-
terized as a more functional alternative for determining whether a con-
tract is executory for purposes of applying § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code.57 These courts have suggested that the Countryman definition is
too restrictive and should also include contracts in which material unper-
formed obligations exist on only one side, so long as assumption or rejec-
tion would benefit the estate.58
C. THE SHOT HEARD AROUND THE IP WORLD: LUBRIZOL
ENTERPRISES, INC. v. RIcHmoND METAL FINISHERS, INC.5 9
In 1985, a decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals seemingly
shattered the reliability of technology licenses.60 A few years before that
decision, Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (RMF) developed a metal-coat-
ing process technology on which it wanted to capitalize. 61 In 1982, RMF
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, l 365.02[2][b].
57. See, e.g., In re Gen. Dev. Corp., 84 F.3d 1364,1374 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Jolly, 574
F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978) (adopting the functional approach in a case under the Bank-
ruptcy Act); Stevens v. CSA, Inc., 271 B.R. 410, 413 (D. Mass. 2001) (explaining that courts
in the First Circuit use both the Countryman standard and the functional analysis approach
to evaluate executory contracts); Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. 138 B.R.
687, 703 n.24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
58. See In re Arrow Air, Inc., 60 B.R. 117, 121-22 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986), where the
court wrote:
The legislative history of § 365, and the statute itself, establish that it is not
always the case that there must be outstanding obligations on the part of
both parties to the contract in order for a contract to be deemed execu-
tory ... . The express language of § 365 reflects that Congress did not adopt a
specific definition of an "executory contract" which would require mutual
obligations, in spite of its clear opportunity to do so. The legislative history to
that section evidences that Congress considered mutual obligations to be in-
dicative of an executory contract in some, but not all, cases. . . . [E]ven
though there may be material obligations outstanding on the part of only one
of the parties to the contract, it may nevertheless be deemed executory under
the functional approach if its assumption or rejection would ultimately bene-
fit the estate and its creditors.
59. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
60. See id.
61. In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (Richmond II), 38 B.R. 341, 342 (E.D. Va.
1984), rev'd sub non., Lubrizol, 756 F.2d 1043.
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entered into a sixteen-year contract with Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc., under
which Lubrizol, as licensee, would have a non-exclusive license to use the
technology. 62 The contract provided that Lubrizol was prohibited from
using the technology for one year after the execution of the agreement.63
In consideration for the license, Lubrizol agreed to make royalty pay-
ments on product sales resulting from the use of the technology and to
forgive certain indebtedness owed by RMF to Lubrizol. 64 Lubrizol also
had certain ongoing accounting, reporting, and confidentiality obligations
under the agreement. 65 In addition to its licensing obligations, RMF was
obligated under the licensing agreement to (i) notify Lubrizol of any pat-
ent infringement suit and defend Lubrizol in any such suit, (ii) notify
Lubrizol of any other use or license of the technology, and (iii) indemnify
Lubrizol for certain losses arising out of the licensing agreement. 66
RMF filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in
August 1983.67 At the time RMF filed for bankruptcy, no royalties had
been paid or credited and the one-year period in which Lubrizol was pro-
hibited from using the technology had just expired. 68 The licensed tech-
nology was a principal asset of RMF's business, and attempts to sell or
license the technology to third parties were hindered by the existing
Lubrizol license.69 RMEF wanted to have the ability to sell or license the
technology to others free from the restrictive provisions in the Lubrizol
agreement. 70 For that reason, RMF moved to reject the licensing agree-
ment under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code shortly after it filed its bank-
ruptcy petition.71 At the hearing on the motion to reject, RMF presented
evidence that to properly fund RMF's Chapter 11 plan, the "sound busi-
ness decision" was to reject the licensing agreement. 72 Lubrizol opposed
the debtor's motion, arguing that (i) the licensing agreement was not ex-
ecutory and, therefore, was not subject to rejection under § 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code and (ii) even if the licensing agreement was executory,
the debtor should not be permitted to reject the agreement because rejec-
tion would not preclude Lubrizol from continuing to use the technology
going forward and, as a result, rejection would not benefit the estate. 73
On the first issue, the bankruptcy court determined that the licensing
agreement was executory for § 365 purposes.74 The court reasoned that
Lubrizol's continuing obligation to make royalty payments under the
62. In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (Richmond 1), 34 B.R. 521, 522 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1983), rev'd, Richmond II, 38 B.R. 341 (E.D. Va. 1984).
63. Richmond H, 38 B.R. at 342.
64. Richmond I, 34 B.R. at 522.
65. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1046.
66. Richmond 1, 34 B.R. at 522.
67. Id.
68. Richmond II, 38 B.R. at 342.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Richmond I, 34 B.R. at 522.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 523, 526.
74. Id. at 526.
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agreement was material, as were RMF's ongoing obligations to notify and
defend against patent infringement suits and to indemnify Lubrizol for
certain losses under the licensing agreement, thus rendering the contract
executory.75
The bankruptcy court next addressed the issue of whether rejection
would provide a benefit to the estate.76 Applying the business judgment
rule, the bankruptcy court held that rejecting the agreement would bene-
fit the estate by permitting the debtor to substitute a new sale or licensing
arrangement that would be more advantageous to the estate and to credi-
tors.7 7 The bankruptcy court rejected Lubrizol's argument that the debtor
could not reject under § 365 because the licensing agreement "represents
a future stream of income and, therefore, rejection will not benefit the
estate."78 Noting that the so-called "burdensome test" was "not the ap-
propriate [test] to be applied," the bankruptcy court found that "rejection
may and should be approved where a contract, while not actually burden-
some to the debtor nonetheless prevents the debtor from entering a more
advantageous arrangement." 79 Having found the licensing agreement ex-
ecutory and the business judgment test satisfied, the court granted the
debtor's motion to reject the licensing agreement.80
On appeal to the district court, the bankruptcy court's decision was
reversed.81 In holding that the licensing agreement could not be rejected,
75. Id. at 524. The bankruptcy court cited In re Select-A-Seat, 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir.
1980), to support its conclusion that the license agreement was an executory contract. Rich-
mond 1, 34 B.R. at 524. The bankruptcy court also rejected Lubrizol's argument that the
licensing agreement was not executory as to RMF because its obligations under the agree-
ment were contingent. Id. Relying on In re Smith Jones, Inc., 26 B.R. 289, 292 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1982), and In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 23 B.R. 104, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982), the bankruptcy court found that "even obligations that may never arise may form
the basis of classifying a contract as executory." Richmond 1, 34 B.R. at 524-25. The bank-
ruptcy court also found support from Professor Countryman himself who stated, "The
usual patent license, by which the patentee-licensor authorizes the licensee to exercise
some part of the patentee's exclusive right to make, use and vend the patented item in
return for payment of royalties, ordinarily takes the form of an executory contract." Id. at
525 (quoting Countryman, supra note 38, at 301).
It should be noted, however, that not all intellectual property licenses are executory
contracts. In In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010), a purchaser of substan-
tially all of an industrial battery business also obtained, as part of the sale transaction, an
exclusive, perpetual, royalty-free license to use the seller's trademark. Id. at 961. When the
seller-licensor filed a Chapter 11 petition many years later and attempted to reject the
license in order to prevent the licensee from using the trademark, the Court of Appeals
held that all of the licensee's material obligations under the agreement were substantially
performed as of the date when the bankruptcy petition was filed and, therefore, if the
licensee breached any remaining obligations, the licensor would not be relieved of its obli-
gation to perform under the license agreement. Id. at 963-64. Therefore, the agreement
was not an executory contract under the Countryman definition and it could not be re-
jected. But see In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 690 F.3d 1069, 1075, (8th Cir. 2012) vacating
as moot No. 11-1850, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12463 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
76. Richmond I, 34 B.R. at 524.
77. Id, at 526.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing In re Smith Jones, Inc., 26 B.R. 289, 293 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982)).
80. Id.
81. Richmond II, 38 B.R. 341, 345 (E.D. Va. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Lubrizol Entrs., Inc.
v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1984). .
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the district court first determined that, contrary to the bankruptcy court's
finding, the licensing agreement was not an executory contract. 82 Analo-
gizing the licensing agreement to a sale of land where the seller retained a
purchase money deed of trust, the court found that RMF's notification
and defense obligations were insufficient to make the contract executory:
There, as here, the subject of the contract has been conveyed and
possession has been taken by the vendee. There, as here, the vendee
has the obligation of making payment for the conveyance as pro-
vided in the contract. There, as here, the vendor has the benefit of
receiving the periodic payments and has the obligation of defending
the vendee's title....
The obligations of the vendor of real estate to defend the pur-
chaser's title is no more onerous than the obligation of the vendor of
technology to defend the vendee's right to exploit it.
Applying this analysis and on the reasoning, (though not necessa-
rily on the conclusion) of Professor Countryman, I find the contract
to be essentially nonexecutory.83
Further, the district court wrote that even if the licensing agreement
was executory, RMF could not reject the contract because rejection pro-
vided no benefit to the estate.84 Most notably, the district court was of the
view that rejection would neither affect Lubrizol's ability to continue ex-
ercising its property rights under the licensing agreement nor relieve its
obligations to continue paying royalties.85 Despite rejection, the court
reasoned that a licensee's right to use licensed technology does not termi-
nate.86 As a result, the district court concluded, rejection would only
serve to relieve RMF of its defense obligations.87 Because RMF's busi-
ness judgment rationale for rejection was the refusal of third parties to
license the technology so long as the Lubrizol license remained in effect,
but rejection of the license agreement would not deprive Lubrizol of the
continued use of the technology, rejection would have "at best, a margi-
nal effect upon the technology's marketability."8 8 Accordingly, the dis-
trict court found no basis for the debtor's business judgment and
determined rejection was not appropriate. 89
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court and directed entry of an order consistent
with the bankruptcy court's decision.90 First, the Fourth Circuit agreed
82. Id.
83. Id. at 343-45 (emphasis omitted).
84. Id. at 345.
85. Id. at 344.
86. Id. at 343-45.
87. Id. at 344.
88. Id. at 344-45.
89. Id. at 345.
90. Lubrizol Enters., Inc., v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1044 (4th
Cir. 1985).
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with the bankruptcy court that the licensing agreement was an executory
contract.91 Relying on an earlier decision where it adopted the Country-
man test for determining whether a contract was executory for § 365 pur-
poses,9 2 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the continuing obligations of
RMF to notify Lubrizol of further licensing of the technology, to reduce
Lubrizol's royalty rate to meet any favorable grants to subsequent licen-
sees, to notify and defend Lubrizol against suits, and to indemnify
Lubrizol for certain losses under the licensing agreement were material
obligations still outstanding such that the contract was executory as to
RMF.9 3 Likewise, the court found Lubrizol's obligation to make royalty
payments, to comply with various accounting and reporting requirements
under the licensing agreement, and to keep the licensed technology in
confidence for a number of years were sufficiently material to make the
contract executory as to Lubrizol as well. 9 4 Thus, there were material ob-
ligations remaining on both sides when the bankruptcy case commenced.
On the question of whether rejection would benefit the estate, the
Fourth Circuit again agreed with the bankruptcy court's finding.95 Turn-
ing to the business judgment test, the Fourth Circuit evaluated "whether
the decision of the debtor that rejection [would] be advantageous [was] so
manifestly [unreasonable] that it could not be based on sound business
judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice." 9 6 In reversing the
district court, the Fourth Circuit found error in two respects. First, the
district court improperly substituted its business judgment for the
debtor's and, second, the district court misconstrued the law when it con-
cluded that the debtor's rejection of the licensing agreement would not
deprive Lubrizol of its right to continue using the licensed technology. 97
As to Lubrizol's right to continue using the licensed technology, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's holding as a "misapprehension
of controlling law":
[W]e can only conclude that the district court was under a misappre-
hension of controlling law in thinking that by rejecting the agree-
ment the debtor could not deprive Lubrizol of all rights to the
process. Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), Lubrizol would be entitled to
treat rejection as a breach and seek a money damages remedy; how-
ever, it could not seek to retain its contract rights in the technology
by specific performance even if that remedy would ordinarily be
91. Id. at 1044-45.
92. Id. at 1045 (citing Gloria Mfg. Corp. v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 734
F.2d 1020, 1022 (4th Cir. 1984)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1046.
95. Id. at 1047.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1047-48. The Fourth Circuit found no evidence in the record from which the
district court could have determined that the debtor's decision was the result of anything
other than its sound business judgment. In the absence of such evidence, the Fourth Circuit
found, "the business judgment rule required that the debtor's factual evaluation be ac-
cepted by the court." Id. at 1047.
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available upon breach of this type of contract.98
Viewing Lubrizol's continued use of the licensed technology after the
debtor's rejection as akin to specific enforcement under the licensing
agreement, the Fourth Circuit looked to the legislative history of § 365(g)
and found that the nondebtor party to a rejected contract was limited to a
money-damages claim against the bankruptcy estate.99 Allowing Lubrizol
to obtain specific performance after the debtor rejected the licensing
agreement, the Fourth Circuit concluded, "would obviously undercut the
core purpose of rejection under § 365(a), and that consequence cannot
therefore be read into congressional intent." 00
The Fourth Circuit was not unaware of the potential harm that could
flow from its decision.101 The court acknowledged that its decision would
create "serious burdens" on contracting parties and "have a general chil-
ling effect upon the willingness of such parties to contract at all with busi-
nesses in possible financial difficulty" 02 but felt that it could not consider
such equitable considerations in the face of clear Congressional intent. 103
The court wrote that Congress was aware of the consequences flowing to
a nondebtor party from a debtor's rejection of an executory contract and
how to protect against it, as was evidenced by § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which allows tenants of real property to remain in possession not-
withstanding a debtor-landlord's rejection of a real property lease.104 Be-
cause Congress had not provided comparable treatment for technology
licensees, in a grave understatement, the Fourth Circuit cautioned that
Lubrizol would have to "share the general hazards created by § 365 for
all business entities dealing with potential bankrupts." 05 The hazard for
Lubrizol would be the loss of its right to use its licensed intellectual
property.
D. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION Acr OF
1988: CONGRESs's RESPONSE TO LUBRIZOL
In 1988, the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act was en-
acted for the purpose of legislatively overruling the Lubrizol decision and
eliminating the threat to technology licensees when licensors become
debtors in bankruptcy.'06
The purpose of the bill is to amend § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
to make clear that the rights of an intellectual property licensee to
use the licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of






104. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(h); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, 365.11.
105. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
106. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538
(codified in Title 11 of the United States Code); see S. REP. No. 100-505, at 2-3 (1988).
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the rejection of the license pursuant to § 365 in the event of the licen-
sor's bankruptcy. Certain recent court decisions interpreting § 365
have imposed a burden on American technological development that
was never intended by Congress in enacting § 365. The adoption of
this bill will immediately remove that burden and its attendant threat
to the development of American Technology and will further clarify
that Congress never intended for § 365 to be so applied.107
As reflected in the senate report relating to the legislation, Congress
viewed the Lubrizol decision as a misreading of § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 08 The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act was de-
signed to correct this misreading by adding to § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code a subsection (n), which provides that upon rejection by the licensor,
the licensee of intellectual property may elect to either treat the contract
as terminated by the rejection or retain its rights to the use of the intellec-
tual property, including exclusivity provisions, for the duration of the li-
cense period, including any period for which the license could be
extended under the agreement.109 In particular, subsection (1) of § 365(n)
provides:
If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor
is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under
such contract may elect-
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such
rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle
the licensee to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own
terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the
licensee with another entity; or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity
provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract)
under such contract and under any agreement supplementary to such
contract, to such intellectual property (including any embodiment of
such intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable
nonbankruptcy law), as such rights existed immediately before the
case commenced, for-
(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the
licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law.110
If a licensee elects to keep its rights under the licensing contract under
§ 365(n)(1), the trustee must allow the licensee to continue exercising its
107. S. REP. No. 100-505, at 1-2.
108. See S. REP. No. 100-505, at 3 ("Congress never anticipated that the presence of
executory obligations in an intellectual property license would subject the licensee to the
risk that, upon bankruptcy of the licensor, the licensee would lose not only any future
affirmative performance required of the licensor under the license, but also any right of the
licensee to continue to use the intellectual property as originally agreed in the license
agreement.").
109. Id. at 5-6.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1).
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rights under the agreement, but with certain limitations.111 Although a
licensee electing to retain its rights under a licensing agreement retains its
right to specifically enforce exclusivity provisions, it loses the right to
seek specific performance with respect to all other covenants under the
licensing agreement.112 As explained in the legislative history of § 365(n),
this limitation "recognizes that continued affirmative performance of an
intellectual property license may be impractical; for instance, a trustee
will generally be unable to perform covenants calling for continued re-
search to improve licensed intellectual property." 113
It is not surprising that the licensee that elects to retain its rights under
a rejected license is not released of all of its obligations under the license
agreement.114 Most notably, in exchange for its continued use of the li-
cense, the licensee must continue to make all royalty payments under the
licensing agreement. The licensee is also deemed to have waived any set-
off rights it may have against the debtor so that royalty payments may not
be reduced by any damages suffered by the debtor's nonperformance of
covenants.115 Similarly, the licensee is deemed to have waived any right
to seek administrative expense priority under § 503(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code with respect to any claim it may have against the debtor licensor.116
These provisions represent a compromise between the debtor's and licen-
see's respective needs: the licensee retains its right to use the licensed
intellectual property, which may be essential to the continuation of its
business, while the debtor, no longer able to relicense or sell the intellec-
tual property after rejection, receives the royalty payments-free of the
burden of offsets or administrative priority claims-needed to effectuate
its reorganization.' 17
Rejection of a licensing agreement does not free the trustee or debtor
of all of its performance obligations under a licensing agreement. To
make the election to retain the use of the licensed intellectual property
meaningful, on written request, the trustee or debtor in possession must,
to the extent provided in the license agreement, provide the licensee with
any intellectual property, including an embodiment, held by the trustee
or debtor in possession and must not interfere with the licensee's rights to
the intellectual property, including the right to obtain it from a third
party." 8
While the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988 leg-
islatively overruled the Fourth Circuit's Lubrizol decision with respect to
the license of patented technology at issue, the Act did not extend protec-
tion to all intellectual property. Section 365(n), by its terms, applies to
111. Id. § 365(n)(2).
112. Id. § 365(n)(1)(B).
113. S. REP. No. 100-505, at 8.
114. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (n)(2)(B).
115. Id. § 365(n)(2)(C)(i).
116. Id. § 365(n)(2)(C)(ii).
117. See S. REP. No. 100-505, at 10.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3).
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licensees to "executory contract[s] under which the debtor is a licensor of
a right to intellectual property."119 However, the Act also added a defini-
tion of "intellectual property" to the Bankruptcy Code, which does not
include all types of property that are generally known in the business and
legal worlds as "intellectual property." In particular, "intellectual prop-
erty" is defined in § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code to mean:
(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under Title 35;
(C) patent application;
(D) plant variety;
(E) work of authorship protected under Title 17; or
(F) mask work protected under Chapter 9 of Title 17; to the extent
protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law.120
Conspicuous in their absence are any mention of trademarks, trade
names, and service marks. As explained in the legislative history of the
1988 Act, while Congress was concerned about the rights of licensees
under trademark, trade name, and service mark license agreements under
the Lubrizol line of reasoning, Congress opted not to address these types
of intellectual property at that time because "such contracts raise[d] is-
sues beyond the scope of th[e] legislation." 1 2 1 Particularly, Congress
thought this area required more extensive study because "trademark,
trade name and service mark licensing relationships depend to a large
extent on control of the quality of the products or services sold by the
licensee." 122 For example, if a franchisor of restaurants becomes a debtor
in a Chapter 11 case, it may want to reject a certain franchise agreement
under § 365(a) and terminate its franchise relationship with a poorly-
managed, unprofitable restaurant. Since such franchisees are often given
trademark licenses so they can use the trade name and trademark of the
franchisor on their restaurants, menus, napkins, and related products, if a
franchisee with a rejected franchise agreement could continue to use the
trademarks but be relieved of the obligation to comply with quality con-
trol covenants, the result would be a lowering or elimination of quality
standards while the trademark of the licensor would continue to be used
by the franchisee. This concern led Congress to "postpone congressional
action in this area and to allow the development of equitable treatment of
this situation by bankruptcy courts."123 However, in the quarter century
since the enactment of the 1988 Act, Congress has yet to address the
rights of licensees when a debtor in bankruptcy rejects a licensing agree-
ment for trademarks, trade names, and service marks.
Of course, under the reasoning of Lubrizol, rejection of a trademark
license by a licensor in bankruptcy could result in the loss of the licensee's
119. Id. § 365(n)(1).
120. Id. § 101(35A).





right to use the trademark.12 4 Ironically, the likelihood that bankruptcy
courts would deprive a licensee of the right to use a trademark under a
rejected license was actually enhanced after the enactment of the 1988
Act. Several courts have found that, relying on what they perceived as a
negative inference of the legislation, the exclusion of trademarks from the
definition of "intellectual property" meant that Congress intended that
Lubrizol's holding would continue to govern trademark license
rejections. 125
E. TRANSACTIONAL STRUCTURES DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE RISKS
TO A LICENSEE FLOWING FROM REJECTION OF A
TRADEMARK LICENSE
Given the reliance of trademark licensees on long-term licensing ar-
rangements, the magnitude of the investment, and the uncertainty of the
long-term financial viability of any licensor, it is not surprising that in the
wake of Lubrizol and Congress's failure to extend the protections of
§ 365(n) to trademarks, licensees and their attorneys have devised trans-
actional steps and complex structures designed to offer some degree of
protection to trademark licensees from the adverse effects of a licensor's
rejection of the license agreement in bankruptcy. For example, rather
than structure the transaction as a licensing arrangement, the initial trans-
action could be structured as a sale or absolute assignment of the intellec-
tual property. If a licensing arrangement is required, the transaction
could include the trademark owner first transferring title to the trade-
mark to a trust or "bankruptcy-remote" entity, which becomes the licen-
sor. These entities, which typically have no assets other than the
intellectual property, have no debts, and have independent directors and
corporate governance documents designed to reduce the likelihood that a
bankruptcy petition will be filed, that the licensor will ever become a
debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, and that the license therefore, will
ever be rejected. Another option is for the licensor to grant the licensee a
security interest in its assets, including the trademark itself. Rejection of
an executory contract does not deprive the nondebtor party from the
benefit of a security interest securing the debtor's obligations under the
agreement.126 Therefore, rejection of a trademark license would not ter-
minate the licensee's security interest in the trademark. Although the se-
curity interest will not eliminate the licensor's power to reject the license,
it will result in the licensee having a secured claim for any damages that
124. See, e.g., Harrell v. Colonial Holdings, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. Va. 2013).
125. See, e.g., In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Trade-
marks are not 'intellectual property' under the Bankruptcy Code . .. [therefore,] rejection
of licenses by [a] licensor deprives [the] licensee of [the] right to use [a] trademark .... );
In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) ("[S]ince the
Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks in its protected class of intellectual prop-
erty, Lubrizol controls and the Franchisees' right to use the trademarks stops on
rejection.").
126. See, e.g., Leasing Servs. Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank, 826 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.
1987).
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result from the rejection, which would give the licensee the right to re-
ceive full payment for all such damages up to the value of the collateral,
including the value of the trademark subject to the security interest,
rather than receiving only a fraction of its claim as an unsecured credi-
tor.1 2 7 This enhanced position is likely to act as a disincentive to the licen-
sor that otherwise may be inclined to reject the license agreement. 128
These transactional options do not necessarily give perfect protection,
and they may not be feasible or cost efficient in a particular situation.
From the standpoint of trademark licensees, a more preferable develop-
ment would be a legislative solution that provides the kind of protection
offered to other intellectual property licensees under § 365(n) or a judi-
cial solution that assures licensees of the right to continued use of a trade-
mark under a licensing agreement despite rejection by the licensor in
bankruptcy.
F. A RECENT VICTORY FOR TRADEMARK LICENSEES IN THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: THE SUNBEAM PRODUCTS DECISION
The first major appellate decision to determine the effect of rejection
by a licensor of an intellectual property licensing agreement after
Lubrizol and the passage of the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protec-
tion Act of 1988 was the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing,
LLC.12 9 Sunbeam involved the Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing
Company, which manufactured and sold various consumer products, in-
cluding box fans. 130 Losing money on every fan, Lakewood decided to
outsource the manufacture of some of its products, including its box fans,
to third parties. 131 As a result, Lakewood entered into an outsourcing
agreement with Chicago American Manufacturing ("CAM"), under
which CAM would manufacture Lakewood's box fans.132 Under the
terms of the outsourcing agreement, Lakewood would supply the fan mo-
tor and cord at no cost to CAM, and CAM, in turn, would provide the
other raw materials and assemble the fans.133 Lakewood would then
purchase the fans at a set price directly from CAM and then resell them
to its customers.134
127. Id. at 436.
128. For a more fulsome discussion of these structural devices and transactional options
designed to minimize the risks flowing from rejection of an intellectual property license,
see Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing Intellectual Property and Technol-
ogy from the Financially-Troubled or Startup Company: Prebankruptcy Strategies to Mini-
mize the Risk in a Licensee's Intellectual Property and Technology Investment, 55 Bus.
LAW. 1649, 1691 (2000).
129. 686 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2012).
130. Id. at 375. "Prior to 2008, Lakewood was one of the three largest manufacturers of
box fans in the United States." In re Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg., 459 B.R. 306, 312 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2011).
131. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 374.





Concerned about Lakewood's financial status, in late 2008 CAM
sought to replace the outsourcing agreement with a supply agreement
that would allow CAM to license the Lakewood trademark and sell the
box fans it had manufactured directly to third parties in the event Lake-
wood was unable to purchase the fans CAM manufactured. 135 Under the
supply agreement, CAM was to manufacture a set number of fans each
month in accordance with a forecast schedule, and Lakewood was to or-
der all of its actual requirements of box fans within thirty days after each
forecasted month solely from CAM.136 If Lakewood failed to purchase all
fans manufactured under the forecast schedule within thirty days after
the month for which those fans were forecasted as required by Lake-
wood, CAM would have been entitled under the supply agreement to sell
any fans not purchased by Lakewood "in Lakewood's packaging and
under Lakewood's name, to any customer whatsoever, including, but not
limited to, any customers of Lakewood." 37 The parties entered into the
supply agreement in December 2008.138 Two months after signing the
contract, however, Lakewood's profits did not improve, and several of
Lakewood's creditors filed an involuntary petition against the company
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.139 The order for relief under
Chapter 7 was entered, and a trustee was appointed to liquidate Lake-
wood's assets in 2009.140
When the trustee sought to effectuate a sale of the company's assets, he
filed a motion to reject the supply contract with CAM because of his con-
cern that it would negatively impact the sale process.141 Although CAM
did not oppose the motion, it took the position that the rejection did not
affect its continuing right to sell fans under the supply agreement. 142
Shortly after rejection, the trustee entered into a purchase agreement
with Sunbeam Products, Inc., doing business as Jarden Consumer Prod-
ucts, under which Jarden purchased Lakewood's assets, including its pat-
ents and trademarks.143 Jarden, however, did not want to buy the fans in
CAM's inventory, nor did it want CAM selling the fans in competition
with Jarden.144 Despite Jarden's objections, however, CAM continued to
sell the Lakewood-branded fans, resulting in Jarden's commencement of
an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court against CAM alleging
patent and trademark infringement.145
Entering judgment in favor of CAM, the bankruptcy court held that
the trustee's rejection of the supply agreement did not terminate either
135. Id. at 316.
136. Id. at 317-18.
137. Id. at 333.
138. Id. 335.
139. Id. at 320.
140. Id. at 322.
141. Id. at 323.
142. Id. at 323, 325.
143. Id. at 326.
144. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 2012).
145. Lakewood, 459 B.R. at 310.
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the patent or trademark licenses granted to CAM under that agree-
ment. 146 With respect to the patents, the bankruptcy court held that
§ 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code protected CAM's right to continue to
use the intellectual property despite the rejection.147 The bankruptcy
court also held that, despite the fact that § 365(n) does not apply to trade-
mark licenses, CAM was entitled to continue using the trademarks and to
make and sell as many fans as Lakewood had estimated it would need for
the entire 2009 selling season.148
The bankruptcy court explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Lubrizol. Finding no controlling authority on point in the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the bankruptcy court found persuasive a concurring opinion ren-
dered by Judge Thomas L. Ambro in a recent Third Circuit case, In re
Exide Technologies.149 In Exide, the bankruptcy court approved rejection
under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code of an integrated agreement for
the sale of Exide's industrial battery business, which included a perpetual,
exclusive, royalty-free license granting the buyer the right to use the Ex-
ide trademark in connection with the business.150 Based on the reasoning
of Lubrizol and a negative inference from § 365(n), the bankruptcy court
held that rejection of the agreement terminated the licensee's right to use
the licensed trademark.151 "[A] trademark license is terminated upon re-
jection and the licensee is left only with a claim for damages."152
The district court affirmed the decision in Exide, but the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the agreement was not
an executory contract under the Countryman standard because all obliga-
tions of the licensee had been substantially performed and, therefore, the
license could not be rejected.153 In a concurring opinion in Exide, Judge
Ambro agreed with the majority's decision, but added that even if the
agreement were an executory contract, rejection would not necessarily
result in termination of the licensee's right to use the trademark.154 Judge
Ambro pointed to the legislative history of § 365(n) indicating that trade-
marks were excluded from the definition of "intellectual property" be-
cause trademarks needed more extensive study, and "it was determined
to postpone congressional action in this area and to allow the development
of equitable treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts."'55 Judge
Ambro found this statement in the legislative history to be justification
for bankruptcy courts to use their equitable powers to give the debtor a
fresh start without stripping a licensee of its fairly-procured trademark
146. Id. at 347.
147. Id. at 341-43.
148. Id. at 345-46.
149. 607 F.3d 957, 964-68 (3d Cir. 2010).
150. Id. at 961.
151. In re Exide Tech, 340 B.R. 222, 250 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006), vacated, 607 F.3d 957
(2010).
152. Id. at 250 n.40.
153. Id. at 964.
154. Id. at 964-65.




Courts may use § 365 to free a bankrupt trademark licensor from
burdensome duties that hinder its reorganization. They should not-
as occurred in this case-use it to let a licensor take back trademark
rights it bargained away. This makes bankruptcy more a sword than a
shield, putting debtor-licensors in a catbird seat they often do not
deserve.157
Following Judge Ambro's reasoning in Exide, the bankruptcy court in
Sunbeam opted to "not follow, in lockstep fashion, those few trial courts
to have decided that the non-binding Lubrizol holding is the only possi-
ble outcome," and it found on equitable grounds that CAM was entitled
to continue using the Lakewood trademark to sell the forecasted fans that
Lakewood failed to purchase under the supply agreement.' 58
Jarden appealed the bankruptcy court's decision in Sunbeam directly to
the court of appeals under a direct appeal procedure reserved for, among
others, situations involving a matter of public importance or in which
there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals or Supreme Court
as to a question of law.' 59 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of
the bankruptcy court, holding that rejection of the trademark license did
not deprive the licensee, CAM, of the right to continued use the trade-
mark.' 60 However, the Seventh Circuit rejected the reasoning of the
bankruptcy court and Judge Ambro's concurring opinion in Exide, which
justified allowing CAM to retain its right to use the trademark based on
equitable grounds.161 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, who wrote the Sev-
enth Circuit's opinion, explained his disapproval of bankruptcy judges
making these determinations based on equitable principles:
What the Bankruptcy Code provides, a judge cannot override by de-
claring that enforcement would be 'inequitable.' . . . There are hun-
dreds of bankruptcy judges, who have many different ideas about
what is equitable in any given situation. Some may think that equity
favors licensees' reliance interests; others may believe that equity fa-
vors the creditors, who can realize more of their claims if the debtor
can terminate IP licenses. Rights depend . .. on what the Code pro-
vides rather than on notions of equity. 162
Taking a more textual approach in applying the Bankruptcy Code, the
Seventh Circuit based its conclusion on § 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which provides that rejection constitutes a breach by the debtor licen-
sor.16 3 Focusing on what would happen outside of bankruptcy if the licen-
156. In re Exide Tech., 607 F.3d at 967.
157. Id. at 967-68.
158. In re Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg., 459 B.R. 306, 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (2006); Sunbeam Prods. Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686
F.3d 372, 372-73 (7th Cir. 2012).
160. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 373.
161. Id. at 375.
162. Id. at 375-76.
163. Id. at 376-77.
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sor breached the license agreement, the court found that the licensee's
right to use the trademark would continue despite the licensor's
breach.'" "[O]utside of bankruptcy, Lakewood could not have ended
CAM's right to sell the box fans by failing to perform its own duties any
more than a borrower could end the lender's right to collect by declaring
that the debt will not be paid"165:
After rejecting a contract, a debtor is not subject to an order of spe-
cific performance. . . . The debtor's unfulfilled obligations are con-
verted to damages; when a debtor does not assume the contract
before rejecting it, these damages are treated as a pre-petition obli-
gation, which may be written down in common with other debts of
the same class. But nothing about this process implies that any rights
of the other contracting party have been vaporized.166
Commenting that scholars uniformly criticized Lubrizol because it con-
fused rejection of a contract with the use of an avoiding power, 167 the
Seventh Circuit indicated that it too was unpersuaded by the landmark
Fourth Circuit decision.s68 It criticized Lubrizol for devoting "scant atten-
tion to the question whether rejection cancels a contract, worrying in-
stead about the right way to identify executory contracts to which the
rejection power applies."1 69
Though the Seventh Circuit's decision goes a long way in protecting the
rights of trademark licensees, the full impact of Sunbeam is unclear be-
cause of the many unanswered questions that remain for courts that fol-
low it. In particular, if the license agreement gives the licensee the
exclusive right to use a trademark, what effect will rejection have on such
exclusivity rights? Since rejection constitutes a breach by the debtor-li-
censor, is the licensee relieved of its obligations under the agreement? Is
the licensee under a rejected license agreement, as a condition to contin-
ued use of the trademark, required to continue to make royalty payments
under the agreement? Will the licensee be required to comply with other
covenants, such as those relating to quality control, after the license
agreement is rejected? Since the licensee's remedies are limited to filing a
claim against the bankruptcy estate for any monetary damages caused by
the licensor's rejection, and the licensee has no right to seek specific per-
formance of the agreement, is the debtor-licensor or any successor to the
licensor relieved of any contractual obligations to defend the trademark
and protect it against infringement?
164. Id. at 377.
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. The court cited various scholars. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANK-
RUPTCY 130-40, 139 n.10 (Foundation Press 4th ed. 2006); Michael T. Andrew, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection", 59 U. COLo. L. REv. 845, 916-19
(1988); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission's Recommendations Concerning the
Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 470-72 (1997).
168. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377-78.
169. Id. at 377.
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It remains to be seen how courts will resolve these questions and the
extent to which they will look to § 365(n) for guidance or analogous ap-
plication. In any event, despite Judge Easterbrook's disapproval of bank-
ruptcy judges basing their decisions on what they think is the equitable
result, the lack of legislative direction in this complex area resulting from
Congress's failure to address the effects of rejection of trademark licenses
in almost twenty-five years since the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy
Protection Act of 1988 was enacted may leave judges with no alternative
but to resolve these questions by weighing the equities of the parties
under the particular circumstances.
III. CONCLUSION
The split in the circuits on whether a licensee has the right to continue
to use a trademark after the licensor rejects the license agreement in
bankruptcy can only be resolved by Congress or the United States Su-
preme Court. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that such resolution will come
in the near term, especially since the Supreme Court denied a writ of
certiorari in Sunbeam.170
The circuit split and the unanswered questions raised by the decision in
Sunbeam cry out for a legislative solution. Congress has already made the
policy determination in 1988 that licensees of intellectual property should
not lose the right to continued use of technology by reason of a licensor's
rejection in bankruptcy-a decision that affords the intellectual property
rights of such licensors greater weight than the general reorganization
policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code. The time is long overdue for
Congress to complete its task of refining and implementing a clear policy
relating to the rights of licensees of a rejected trademark license
agreement.
170. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 133 S. Ct. 790, 790 (2012).
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